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Abstract
The paper analyses the impact of private equity (PE) backed leveraged buyouts (LBOs) on
innovative output (patenting). Using a sample of 407 UK deals we find that LBOs have a
positive causal effect on patent stock and quality-adjusted patent stock. Our results imply a
6% increase in quality-adjusted patent stock three years after the deal. The increase in
innovative activity is concentrated among private-to-private transactions with a 14% increase
in the quality-adjusted patent stock. We also find evidence suggesting that PE firms facilitate
the relaxation of financial constraints. In sum, our findings suggest that PE firms do not
promote short-term cost-cutting at the expense of entrepreneurial investment opportunities
with a long-term pay-off.
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21. Introduction
Private equity (PE) firms establish funds in order to raise capital that is then put towards the
acquisition of a portfolio of mature firms (Kaplan and Stromberg, 2009). The ‘portfolio
firms’ are acquired via a Leveraged Buyout (LBO) because PE firms will use debt finance,
secured against portfolio firms’ assets and/or future cash flows, in order to facilitate the
transaction (Gilligan and Wright, 2014). There is controversy, however, regarding the ‘real’
economic consequences for firms subject to an LBO (Cumming et al., 2007). Proponents
argue that the LBO governance structure creates incentives for managers to generate value by
reducing unprofitable discretionary expenditures and pursuing profitable growth
opportunities (Jensen, 1986; Wright et al, 2000; Boucly et al., 2011).1 In contrast, critics
argue that PE firms’ short-term investment horizon promotes the generation of short-term
profit and high leverage diverts cash away from longer-term investments towards servicing
debt (Rappaport, 1990).
Whether LBOs create financial incentives to make entrepreneurial investments with a longer-
term payoff or focus on short-term cost-cutting is a long-standing controversy. Empirical
analysis of innovative activity is well-suited to addressing the controversy because it typically
involves making investments that yield a longer-term pay-off. If LBOs create incentives to
pursue profitable opportunities that have a longer-term pay-off, we expect to observe an
increase in productive innovation. Some prior studies have examined R&D expenditure (e.g.
Lichtenberg and Siegel, 1990; Long and Ravenscraft, 1993); however, it is a problematic
measure of innovative activity because it is unable to distinguish between productive and
unproductive expenditure. Evidence suggests that LBO firms make more productive use of
R&D expenditure by improving product development and the commercialization of
1 Key features of the LBO governance structure are: active PE investors with board representation, debt
bonding, and strong management incentives derived from their equity ownership (Jensen, 1986; Thompson and
Wright, 1995).
3technology (Zahra, 1995). This is because LBOs provide incentives to adopt entrepreneurial
practices and innovation strategies to exploit their R&D investments (Bruining et al., 2013;
Link et al., 2014). Analysis of innovative output therefore provides better understanding of
LBOs’ impact on firms’ longer-term prospects.
Patents are a widely used measure of innovation outcomes and are useful for the purpose of
analyzing LBOs impact on innovation because they are observable in privately owned firms,
unlike R&D expenditure. Lerner et al. (2011) find that firms’ level of patenting does not
change post-LBO but patents are more frequently cited, which suggests that portfolio firms
are producing research that has greater economic impact; however, they are unable to
determine whether this is a selection or a causal effect. Ughetto (2010) shows the impact of
PE firms on innovation outcomes is not necessarily uniform; PE firms’ size, stage
specialization, and geographical location as well as deal characteristics are correlated with
portfolio firms’ patent activity. A limitation of her research is that due to the absence of non-
PE backed firms in the sample, she does not establish whether PE-backed LBOs lead to
greater patenting activity. We identify a causal relationship between a PE-backed LBO and
patent activity and seek to establish PE firms’ role as a source of entrepreneurial finance that
relaxes LBO targets’ financial constraints. We recognize that financial constraints are
notoriously difficult to measure and adopt various approaches to analyzing this impact.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes the theoretical
arguments in the related literature, section 3 describes the empirical strategy, and section 4
provides a description of the data. Results of the empirical analysis are presented in section 5
and section 6 concludes.
42. Theoretical considerations
The paper is concerned with the effect of PE firms on financial constraints and therefore the
funding of innovation. We therefore focus on the role of PE firms as a source of
entrepreneurial finance in the capital market.
2.1 PE firms can reduce external capital market imperfections
Capital markets are fraught with information asymmetries. Suppliers of finance are
confronted with an adverse selection problem leading to the rationing of finance (Stiglitz and
Weiss, 1981). In such a scenario firms underinvest in a variety of activities, including R&D
(Hubbard, 1998). Since asymmetric information problems are probably more pronounced for
R&D than for tangible investment, and the collateral value of intangible assets is limited,
financial constraints are arguably more severe for the financing of innovation (Brown et al.,
2012). Further, the riskiness of R&D makes debt financing particularly difficult to obtain,
since in contrast to equity market investors, creditors do not benefit from upside returns
(Brown et al., 2009; Hsu et al., 2014). Financial development is therefore important in
relaxing financial constraints, leading to more innovation (Laeven et al. 2013; Amore et al.,
2013). We argue below that PE plays an important role in relaxing financial constraints and
facilitating innovative activity.
The extent to which different types of firms are financially constrained and suffer from
underinvestment varies (Boucly et al., 2011). Expectations regarding listed corporations are
somewhat ambiguous. Listed corporations are generally expected to experience little
underinvestment due to the financing constraints that result from investor asymmetric
information. However, some listed corporations may face financing constraints because
short-term investors are unwilling to allow them the time and resources they need to innovate
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financing constraints as PE investors have a longer time horizon than stock market investors
(Lerner et al., 2011). The argument for going private in order to innovate also rests on the
assumption that PE investors have specialist expertise that gives them both better information
and the ability to act on that information than stock market investors. Moreover, although
after the LBO a firm takes on debt repayment commitments, LBOs are not homogeneous
regarding innovative potential, the amount of leverage involved and the amount of debt they
can service. PE firms use their expertise to take account of these differences in the structuring
of the deal. LBOs focused on enhancing efficiency are typically seen by PE firms as deals
able to service high debt repayment commitments. In contrast, lower debt levels may be used
to provide the flexibility to undertake risky innovative activities (Wright et al., 2000). In our
empirical analysis below we introduce controls for the amount of leverage.
In contrast, to publicly listed corporations, private firms suffer from underinvestment due to
their reliance on internal finance (Carpenter and Petersen, 2002) and difficulties in accessing
finance from banks (Behr et al., 2013). This is because private firms find difficulty in
conveying information to finance providers (Behr et al., 2013). Further, the goals and
behavior of private firm owners may also constrain access to external finance to fund
innovation. For instance, private firm owners may seek to retain control and hence be
reluctant to dilute ownership through opening up their share capital to external investors.
PE is able to attenuate these capital market imperfections, leading to increased investment
after an LBO (Berger and Udell, 1998; Engel and Stiebale, 2014). Boucly et al. (2011)
identify mechanisms associated with corporate governance and financial expertise through
which PE firms facilitate access to finance; hence, relaxing financial constraints. First, PE
6firms are active investors who monitor senior management performance and their strategic
decisions. This is facilitated by representation on the board of directors. This improvement in
corporate governance helps overcome the moral hazard problem, providing creditors with the
confidence that funds are used productively. Second, PE firms’ financial expertise is a
reassurance to creditors, making it more likely they will provide funds for investment.
Consequently, portfolio firms are less likely to suffer from underinvestment than private
firms with no PE firm involvement. If private firms were underfunding innovation activity
prior to an LBO, we expect to observe an increase in innovation activity after an LBO.
Correspondingly, for those LBOs that subsequently go through a second buyout (SBO),
which involves a PE firm acquiring a portfolio firm from another PE firm (Alperovych et al.,
2013), we expect to observe little if any increase in innovation activity after SBO. This is
likely to be the case where the incoming PE firm is performing the same functions as the
outgoing PE firm. In contrast, an incoming PE firm with larger funds available and greater
expertise may be able to facilitate more innovation activity.
2.2 Divisional buyouts and internal capital market imperfections
Williamson (1975, 1985) argues that large organizations adopt a divisional organizational
structure and use an internal capital market to allocate resources due to the failure of the
external capital market in overcoming information asymmetries. A potential advantage of the
internal capital market is its superior access to information compared to the external capital
market. The audit function of head office and its ability to gather information enables head
office to make superior capital allocation decisions than the external capital market. The
divisions, being profit centers, are allocated financial resources on the basis of the return they
are able to generate. Efficient decision-making involves operational decisions being taken at
divisional level while strategic and capital allocation decisions are taken at corporate head
7office level. These features allow it to act as an effective hierarchical governance device with
divisional managers’ focusing on profit maximization (Williamson, 1985).
Williamson (1985) acknowledges that there are limits to the effectiveness of the internal
capital market as a control, incentive and governance device. Such limits allow divisional
managers to indulge in opportunism and ‘politicking’, resulting in misallocation of resources.
When superficial investment decision-making is present, the firm is likely to underperform
(Hill, 1988), leading to pressure for diversified firms to refocus their activities (Berger and
Ofek, 1999). In addition, such firms are more likely to be subject to a takeover because the
transfer of financial resources within the internal capital market accommodates the waste of
free cash flow (Comment and Jarrell, 1995).
The emergence of PE represents an important development in the external capital market. It
facilitates external capital market allocation that might previously have been transacted in an
internal capital market. With board representation facilitating the close monitoring of senior
management and their strategic decisions, PE firms are active investors in their portfolio
firms. As mentioned in section 2.1, this allows PE firms to reduce the information
asymmetries associated with external capital market allocation, negating the need for some
firms to operate within a divisional structure. Moreover, divisions that once suffered
underinvestment due to capital misallocation within the internal capital market can now
operate as independent firms and receive financial resources for innovation. If a division
suffers from underinvestment while operating within an internal capital market, the LBO of a
division is expected to reduce underinvestment. Consequently, profitable investment
opportunities are more likely to be funded after the LBO of a division, leading to an increase
in innovation activity.
8This section has established two competing arguments. First, difficulties in overcoming
informational asymmetries in the external capital market can lead to capital allocation and
investment occurring in the internal capital market. Second, the internal capital market is a
flawed system of capital allocation, leading to underinvestment, and the LBO of a division
can reduce underinvestment because a PE firm is able to facilitate access to external finance.
The empirical analysis addresses this issue by examining the impact of divisional buyouts on
innovation activity. If PE firms reduce external capital market imperfections, making capital
allocation superior to the internal capital market and reducing underinvestment, we expect to
observe an increase in innovation activity after a divisional buyout.
3. Estimation strategy
Our empirical strategy aims to identify the causal effect of PE-backed LBOs on firms’
innovation outcomes. For this purpose, we employ a propensity score matching procedure (to
construct the counterfactual) and combine it with a difference-in-differences estimator in
order to evaluate the impact of an LBO on portfolio firms.
The evaluation of an average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) s periods after a treatment
period t comprises a comparison between the actual innovation outcome of a firm treated to a
PE-backed LBO and the situation had the firm not been acquired. The quantity measured is
expressed as
1 0
1, 1,[ | 1] [ | 1]t s t t t s t tATT E I X PE E I X PE       (1)
where 1t sI  is the innovation outcome of a portfolio firm in period t+s,
0
t sI  is the innovation
outcome of the portfolio firm would have experienced had it not been subject to an LBO (i.e.
9the counterfactual), X contains a set of control variables, and PE is a dummy variable taking
the value one if the firm has been subject to an LBO in any respective year.
Causal inference relies on construction of the counterfactual for the last term in equation (1),
E[ܫ௧ା௦଴ | ܺ௧ି ଵ,ܲܧ௧ = 0]. The construction of the counterfactual is not straightforward if LBO
targets are not randomly selected from the population of firms. For instance, PE firms might
select LBO targets because there is scope for improvement in innovation activity. In this case,
using a randomly selected control sample represents an inadequate approximation of the
counterfactual, rendering measures of the ATT subject to sample selection bias. In their
study, Lerner et al (2011) identify this problem as a limitation of their analysis.
While there is no straightforward solution to the sample selection problem, we attempt to
mitigate it by constructing a control sample using propensity score matching, proposed by
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983). The predicted probability (propensity score) of being subject
to an LBO and becoming a portfolio firm, 1Pˆr( 1| )t tPE X  , is obtained from the estimation
of a Probit model. The vector 1tX  contains only pre-LBO characteristics in order to avoid
reverse causality problems (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008). As we exploit a panel data set, we
can relax the assumption of selection on observables by combining the matching technique
with a difference-in-differences estimator (see, for instance, Blundell and Costa Dias, 2000).
Although this assumes that any unobserved differences between firms are constant over time.
Instead of comparing differences in the innovation levels between the two groups, we focus
on the growth of the innovation stock (Guadalupe et al., 2012; Seru, 2014). This procedure
allows the selection into the group of PE firms to be based on the expected impact on
innovation and on time invariant unobservable characteristics (Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd
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1997). Nevertheless, unobserved time-varying factors that influence both LBO probability
and the innovation outcomes, as well as heterogeneous responses to macroeconomic shocks
across treatment and control groups, would lead to biased estimates.
The difference-in-differences estimator, measuring the effect on innovation of a firm being
subject to an LBO, is expressed as:
1 0
1 1 1 1[ | , 1] [ | , 0]t s t t t t s t t tE I I X PE E I I X PE          . (2)
In practice, this difference-in-differences estimator can be obtained by applying weighted
least squares to the matched data set, with the change in the innovation stock as the
dependent variable:
1
,i t s it t itI PE        (3)
 is the difference-in-difference estimate of the ATT, t represents time dummies and it is
an error term. This representation makes the analysis of heterogeneous effects across
characteristics of portfolio firms straight forward using the following estimation equation:
1
, 0 1 1 ...i t s it it i t K it iKt t itI PE PE Z PE Z             (4)
where iktZ , k = 1,...K, are characteristics of portfolio firms or PE investors to be considered.
Different estimators are proposed in the matching literature. In this paper we primarily focus
on results obtained from nearest neighbor matching without replacement, which means that
each portfolio firm has one comparison firm, implying each LBO firm and each matched
non-LBO firm is given a weight of one. We have also experimented with a propensity score
reweighting estimator (e.g. Imbens, 2004) where we assign a weight equal to
1 1
ˆ ˆPr( 1| ) / (1 Pr( 1| ))t t t tPE X PE X    for all non-LBO firms.
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4. Data and variables
4.1 Data sets
The data set employed is constructed from three sources: the Center for Management
Buyout Research (CMBOR), FAME, and PATSTAT. Data on PE firms and portfolio firms
comes from the CMBOR, which provides information on LBO deals. The CMBOR database
is compiled from a wide range of sources, including biannual surveys of financiers, press
releases, stock exchange circulars, and specialist finance and press coverage. The database
has no lower size cut-off, enabling the examination of the full size range and vendor type of
buyouts; this is especially important for the incorporation of LBOs that were previously
under private ownership (private-to-private transactions).
The second data source is the FAME database, which provides financial and accounting data
for UK firms.2 The FAME database provides information on firms’ sales, productivity,
profitability, capital, wages and industry affiliation. Unconsolidated accounts are chosen to
separate economic activity in portfolio firms from parent companies.
The third data source is PATSTAT, developed by the European Patent Office (EPO) and the
OECD, which provides data on patent applications and citations. We extract patent
applications for the years 1978-2008 for all firms in our sample. The data on patent
applications are merged with the other firm-level data sets using a computer supported search
algorithm based on the firms’ names, addresses and zip (postal) codes. Every match was
checked manually to ensure a good match. We only consider patents that are ultimately
granted but date them back to the application year. This is to ensure that our results measure
2 The database contains the subset of UK firms from the Amadeus database which has been used in numerous
empirical studies (see, for instance, Budd et al., 2005; Helpman et al., 2004; Konings and Vandenbussche,
2005).
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the timing of an innovation but are not affected by the length of the patent granting process.
Besides patent applications, the data allows identifying information on patent citations. We
weight patent applications by forward citations to construct a quality-adjusted measure of
patent counts. In addition, the time dimension allows the construction of an innovation stock
for each firm, which we simply define as the cumulative number of (citation-weighted) patent
applications.
Our estimation sample is based on the years 1998 to 2008. LBOs take place between 1998
and 2005 as we restrict the analysis to firm-year observations for which information on
patenting and citations are available for at least three prospective years after a buyout (we
relax this restriction in robustness checks described in section 5.4). The analysis is based on
143,653 firm-year observations in total. The estimation sample includes 35,081 firms and 407
buyouts. 1,689 non-PE backed and 239 buyout firms file at least one patent application
during the sample period.
4.2 Variables
Our main outcome variables are based on patent applications and the patent applications
weighted by forward citations, i.e. changes in innovation stocks over time. These variables
have previously been employed as measures of innovation activity (e.g. Lerner et al., 2011;
Seru, 2014). The empirical analysis determines and quantifies the causal relationship between
LBOs and the patent variables.
Using patents as an innovation indicator has both advantages and disadvantages over
alternative measures (see e.g. Griliches, 1998). In contrast to R&D expenditures, patents are
(at least an intermediate) innovation output indicator and thus also account for the
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effectiveness with which innovation is pursued. Further, as the number of patents is derived
from administrative data, this indicator does not have to rely on self-reported measures of
new products and processes, which are often used in innovation studies. Patenting is costly
and a granted patent requires a certain degree of novelty which reduces the risk of counting
innovations of little relevance. Finally, the number of patents is a well-established indicator
of innovation which has been used in several recent studies3 and patent applications seem to
be highly correlated with other common indicators of innovative performance (e.g.
Hagedoorn and Cloodt, 2003; Griliches, 1998).
The downside of taking patents as an innovation indicator is that not every invention becomes
patented, and - depending on firms' innovation strategies - firms may make more or less use
of formal IP rights protection (e.g. Hall and Ziedonis, 2001; Ziedonis, 2004). It can also be
expected that there will be substantial variation in the value of patented innovations. To
partly address this problem, the results for patent counts are compared with those using
citation-weighted patents, which are likely to be correlated with the importance of
innovations. If PE firms induce an increase (decrease) in patenting for purely strategic
reasons, we should see an increase (decrease) in the number of non-weighted patents but little
change in citation-weighted patents (e.g. Bloom et al., 2011).
The choice of conditioning variables included in the Probit model that generates the
propensity score used to select firms into the comparison group is based on recent innovation
studies (e.g. Guadalupe et al., 2012). In particular, we construct our comparison group based
on pre-buyout characteristics such as firm size (the log of sales, ln_sales), labour productivity
(the log of sales per employee, ln_Labprod), exporting (an exporter dummy, d_export), skill
3 See, for instance, Aghion et al. (2013), Bena and Li (2014) and Seru (2014).
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intensity (the log of the average wage, ln_av_wage), debt (liabilities divided by equity,
leverage), profitability (profit divided by sales, profit_sales) and age (log firm age, ln_age).
We also control for pre-buyout values of our outcome variables (patent stock and patent
citation stock) to ensure that our results are not affected by PE investors choosing firms based
on previous innovation outcomes. Finally, the Probit model includes two-digit industry
dummies and time dummies. Table 1 contains summary statistics and variable definitions.4
5. Results
5.1 Propensity score matching
The results from the Probit regression, used to generate propensity scores, are reported in
Table 2. In this model, we regress an indicator of LBOs in time period t on control variables
in t-1. We restrict the analysis to firms for which information on patents in time periods t+1,
t+2 and t+3 are available. The results show that PE firms tend to acquire relatively large but
unproductive firms. Firm age as well as exporting reduces the likelihood of a buyout. In
contrast, profitability, average wages, capital intensity, and previous innovation activity do
not have a statistically significant impact on a firm being targeted for an LBO.
While the Probit regression results are interesting in their own right, the principal purpose of
the Probit regression is to generate a propensity score that is used to match firms in the LBO
sample with firms that have not been subject to an LBO. The propensity score matching
method is a reliable and robust method for determining and quantifying the effect of LBOs on
innovation outcomes if the potential innovation outcomes of the LBO sample and the
comparison group are independent of the incidence of LBOs (conditional independence
assumption). Under the ’balancing condition’, the firm-specific variables included in the
4 Because of space limitations we do not provide a detailed breakdown of the industrial distribution. This is
available from the authors on request.
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Probit model should be balanced between the portfolio firms and the comparison group. This
is crucial because it ensures that the propensity score obtained from the Probit regression is
successful in controlling for firm-specific differences between LBO targets and the
comparison group in the pre-LBO period. We test the balancing property by conducting t-
tests on each variable included in the Probit model to test for equality of means between LBO
targets and the comparison group. The tests are reported in Table 3. While t-tests indicate
statistically significant differences between the means of the LBO targets and the unmatched
control sample for some variables - and most importantly the propensity score - we cannot
reject equality of mean values for all control variables in the matched sample at conventional
levels of significance (this is also individually and jointly true for industry and time dummies
which are not shown in the table). This suggests that propensity score matching has been
successful in controlling for observed firm-specific differences between LBO targets and the
comparison group of firms.5
5.2 Estimates from differences-in-differences combined with propensity score matching
Having established that the LBO firms and the comparison group are adequately matched, we
report difference-in-difference estimates based on the matched sample. Table 4 presents
results showing the effects of a PE-backed LBO on the number of patents and the number of
citation-weighted patents. We show the effects for up to three years after an LBO, where t is
the year of the transaction. Panel A shows that the ATT of an LBO on non-weighted patents.
By year t+3, the patent stock increases by about one-third of a patent. The average effect of
an LBO on quality-adjusted patents is also positive. Panel B shows that by year t+3 the
quality-adjusted patent stock increases by about 1.3. Table 1 shows that the average number
of citation-weighted patent applications each year is about one; the cumulated 1.3 increase
5 We also found that the distributions of propensity scores across LBOs and matched controls are very similar. A
graph documenting these distributions is available upon request.
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after 3 years therefore implies that quality-adjusted patent applications after 3 years are on
average about 40% higher due to an LBO. Table 1 also shows that the citation-weighted
patent stock is about 20.6 and so the 1.3 increase implies an increase in the citation-weighted
patent stock by more than 6% after 3 years. The results in Table 4 suggest that PE-backed
LBOs are not only associated with an increase in patenting (Panel A), but quality-adjusted
innovation output also increases (Panel B).
Instead of using a balanced panel of LBOs and potential controls for which three years of
data on post-LBO patenting are available, we also estimate ATT using an unbalanced panel.
This allows us to follow a greater number of portfolio firms over a longer time period of up to
5 years after an LBO. The results are documented in Table A3 in the appendix. Both the
effects on patents and citation-weighted patents increase over time even though the sample
size decreases over time. Note, however, that in periods t+4 and t+5 only the effect on
citation-weighted patent stock is statistically significant and not the effect on patent stock,
possibly due to the smaller number of observations, The results confirm our previous
estimates and indicate that innovation outcomes steadily improve after a buyout.
Having established that the average LBO has a positive effect on innovation outcomes, we
conduct further analysis on the role of PE firms in target firms’ financial constraints. The
possible presence of financial constraints in the target firm is not directly observable;
however, the arguments presented in Section 2 suggest any post-LBO effect on innovation
outcomes will depend on pre-LBO ownership type because ownership structure impacts on
any financial constraints on investment in innovation. Therefore, following the approach of
Boucly et al. (2011), we break our LBO sample into four deal types based on pre-LBO
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ownership: private-to-private transactions (Priv2Priv), public-to-private transactions
(Pub2Priv), divisional buyouts and secondary buyouts.
The heterogeneous effects of deal types are reported in Table 5. It shows that the private-to-
private transaction is the only deal type that has a statistically significant effect on innovation
outcomes. By year t+3 after the LBO the patent stock has increased by nearly one patent (see
Panel A) and the quality-adjusted patent stock has increased by nearly three (Panel B), which
implies a 14% increase in the quality-adjusted patent stock. There is limited and weak
evidence (significance at the 10% level) that public-to-private transactions and divisional
buyouts reduce patent activity.
Overall, these findings are consistent with PE firms alleviating financial constraints in private
firms and facilitating investment in increased innovation outcomes. PE firms do not have
such an impact on other pre-LBO ownership types, however. Indeed, the findings are
consistent with PE investors being no more superior in funding innovation than stock market
investors, the internal capital market, and primary buyouts investors.6
5.3 Additional financial constraints analysis
In order to provide additional support for the argument that PE firms alleviate financial
constraints we conduct two further sets of analysis using a constructed financial dependence
measure and an indicator of creditworthiness provided by FAME which is labelled
“Quiscore” to proxy financial constraints. If the financial constraint hypothesis is true, PE
6 We seek to confirm the finding for private-to-private deals by adopting a model specification that compares
private-to-private deal types with all other remaining PE-backed LBO transactions. Results documented in a
supplementary appendix which is available upon request confirm that the effects of private-to-private
transactions on patent stock and quality-adjusted patents are significantly larger than that for other deal types.As
we discuss in section 5.4, an alternative propensity matching approach based on private-to-private transactions
only leads to very similar results.
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firms will have the largest impact on innovation in industries which are more dependent on
external finance. Moreover, we expect this to be more pronounced in private-to-private deals,
given our previous results. For this analysis, we construct a measure of industry-level
financial dependence proposed by Rajan and Zingales, (1998). It is defined as the difference
between investment and internal cash flow from operations. Previous evidence indicates that
financing constraints are more binding for firms in industries with a high financial
dependence. In particular, it has been shown that firms in industries that depend on external
finance to a high extent benefit most from stock market and banking development (Amore et
al., 2013, Rajan and Zingales, 1998). Hence, if LBOs reduce financing constraints in
portfolio firms, we expect a positive interaction term between PE and financial dependence.
A financial dependence measure is constructed from Compustat data on listed US firms as in
previous empirical analyses (e.g. Kroszner et al., 2007). Using data on listed firms in the US
has two possible advantages. First, listed firms in the US arguably have relatively few
financing obstacles, thus they allow us to measure an industry’s technical dependence on
external finance. Second, using a measure of US industries reduces endogeneity concerns as
the UK firms in our sample are unlikely to affect investment and financing decisions of US
firms. However, we also check the robustness of the results using a measure calculated from
UK firms.
Results from the financial dependence analysis are reported in Table 6. The results in Panel A
confirm previous findings that LBOs have a positive effect on the innovation outcomes of
private-to-private transactions but not for other vendor source types (indicated by the
coefficients for PE × Priv2Priv and PE variables, respectively). Importantly, the positive
effect of private-to-private transaction increases in innovation is notably larger in the
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presence of greater financial dependence (indicated by the coefficient of PE × Priv2Priv ×
findep). These findings are more pronounced for the quality-adjusted patent stock, reported in
Panel B. It shows that private-to-private deals taking place in industries with no financial
dependence have only a weak positive effect in t+1 and no significant effect in subsequent
years. In contrast, the impact of private-to-private LBO transactions on the quality-adjusted
patent stock increases considerably and statistically significantly with financial dependence.
This is consistent with PE firms increasing innovation outcomes through the relaxation of
financial constraints.
A drawback of the financial dependence measure is that it only varies at the industry level
and therefore cannot account for variation in financial constraints across firms within an
industry. Due to these limitations, a further test on the financial constraint hypothesis is
conducted using the Quiscore, obtained from FAME. The Quiscore is a proprietary index of
firms’ creditworthiness where a higher score indicates greater creditworthiness. Firms with a
score of above 80 are identified as being ‘secure’ and at the lowest risk of defaulting on
loans.7 The variables used in the computation of Quiscore are similar to the ones used for
Altman’s Z score but excludes market value data. This is advantageous in our context since
the index can be computed for both public and private firms. For the purpose of our analysis
we assume that these firms are less likely to face financial constraints because creditors are
more likely to provide finance to these firms. In contrast, we define firms with a Quiscore
below 80 as likely to be affected by financial constraints. On this basis we construct a dummy
variable equal to one for all firms with a Quiscore of less than or equal to 80 (in section 5.4
we discuss results using an alternative threshold), zero otherwise. This dummy variable is
7 For instance, Guariglia and Mateut (2010) find that firms with a relatively low Quiscore are more likely to be
financially constrained as evidenced by higher sensitivity of investment to the availability of finance. In general,
credit ratings are often used to classify firms that are likely to face financing constraints (see, for instance
Carreira and Silva, 2010 for an overview and Czarnitzki and Hottenrott, 2011 for an application to R&D).
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defined on the basis of the Quiscore in the year before the buyout (t-1), so that our analysis
can capture any effect of PE firms in relaxing financial constraints. Unfortunately, using the
Quiscore reduces the number of LBO deals in the sample due to incomplete coverage.
The results using the dummy variable constructed from the Quiscore are reported in Table 7.
Panel A and B indicate that LBO transactions, other than private-to-privates, have no
significant impact on patenting in portfolio firms whether or not they have a low Quiscore. In
contrast, Panel B shows that private-to-private LBO transactions have a positive effect on the
quality-adjusted patent stock of firms that are more likely to be financially constrained. This
is again consistent with PE firms increasing innovation output through the alleviation of
financial constraints. A drawback of the Quiscore measure is that it may be correlated with
other firm characteristics including the riskiness of firms. We partly address this issue in
sections 5.4 and 5.5.
While it is not possible to directly observe the role of PE firms in relaxing financial
constraints, this section has presented three sets of analysis in order to build a consistent
picture of PE firms alleviating financial constraints in LBO targets. First, we find that the
principal effect of PE firms on innovation outcomes stems from private-to-private LBO
transactions. Second, we find that the effects of private-to-private LBO transactions are most
pronounced for portfolio firms operating in industries with a high dependence on external
finance. Finally, we show that private-to-private LBO transactions of firms with lower
creditworthiness, which we argue are more likely to be financially constrained, have the
largest effect on quality-adjusted patenting. The results present a general picture of private-
to-private LBO transactions having a positive causal effect on patent stock and citation-
weighted patent stock. This is consistent with PE firms relaxing financial constraints in
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private-to-private deals, leading not only to increased patenting but also to an increase in
quality-adjusted innovation output.
5.4 The impact of PE firm and LBO governance characteristics
While our results support the argument that PE firms relax financial constraints in private-to-
private LBO transactions, we cannot rule out that other factors associated with PE firms and
the post-LBO governance structure impact innovation output. We therefore augment the
model reported in Table 6 with a range of variables previously found to be correlated with
portfolio firms’ innovation and growth (e.g. Ughetto, 2010; Melueman et al., 2009). PE firms
potentially gain organizational experience from their involvement in LBO deals and this
experience can be shared with portfolio firms, we therefore include variables capturing
experience as equity and debt providers. With some PE firms specializing in specific sectors
of the economy, we also include debt and equity experience variables at the sector level to the
analysis. Leverage has a role to play in bonding managers to pay out future cash flows in the
form of interest payments, so leverage is added to the analysis. PE firms often use equity
ratchets (performance-contingent contracts) to motivate the management to achieve
performance targets. We are able to identify which portfolio firms have equity ratchets and
include this variable. Further, we distinguish whether the LBO was a management buy-out
(MBO), which involves incumbent management becoming significant equity holders, or a
management buy-in (MBI), which involves external management becoming significant equity
holders (Gilligan and Wright, 2014). Finally, we include two industry characteristics, the
level of competition and a binary variable for manufacturing industries.
To avoid producing an overwhelming volume of results, we report whether the variables
mentioned above have an effect on innovation outcomes for the period t+3 only in Table 8.
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We first examine each variable separately to establish if there is a statistical relationship. The
final column shows results from the specification including all variables. While there are
some significant interaction terms for the effect on patent stocks (see Panel A), none of the
additional variables have an impact on citation-weighted patent stocks (see Panel B). Most
importantly, none of these additional variables affects our main results. It is noticeable that
private-to-private LBO transactions in financially dependent industries continue to have the
largest impact on patent stock and citation-weighted patenting after the inclusion of
additional variables that explore alternative mechanisms through which LBOs impact on
innovation. The additional analysis allows us to rule out several alternative explanations to
PE firms relaxing financial constraints. Notably, we also find that the effect of post-LBO
leverage and the interaction of leverage with PE firms are not significant, suggesting that the
post-LBO leverage does not introduce a significant financial constraint.
5.5 Robustness checks
We conduct several robustness checks with respect to our estimation method and variable
definitions. The object is to ensure our results are robust to sampling methods and the
measurement of key variables. All these robustness checks are documented and discussed in
more detail in a supplementary appendix which is available upon request.8 With respect to the
matching method, our results are robust towards using a propensity score reweighting
estimator instead of nearest neighbor matching, defining the treatment to be private-to-private
LBO transactions, matching with replacement and using a broader classification of industries
(to account for the fact that there is only a small number of LBO transaction is some 2-digit
industries). Our results on financial dependence hold if we calculate a measure based on UK
rather than US data. The results on firms with a low Quiscore are robust towards an
8 We would like to thank two anonymous referees for suggesting some of these robustness checks.
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alternative threshold (70 instead of 80) and controlling for measures of uncertainty which
might be correlated with Quiscore. We also verify that our results on citation weighted
patents hold if we exclude citations indicating a high blocking potential and citations made by
applicant citations.
6. Conclusions
This paper conducts an empirical analysis of a particularly contentious aspect of the
entrepreneurial finance market. Specifically, we contribute to the debate concerning the role
of PE firms in sacrificing longer-term investment opportunities in the pursuit of short-term
profit. Critics argue that the necessity for PE firms to generate short-term returns for their
fund investors motivates them to promote cost-cutting in order to generate short-term profit
in portfolio firms. Entrepreneurial investment opportunities with a long-term pay-off are
therefore passed over. We would therefore expect a reduction in innovation activity if short-
term cost-cutting is prioritized. In contrast, proponents argue that PE firms are able to
alleviate capital market imperfections for entrepreneurial firms that are financially
constrained. PE firms are a source of entrepreneurial finance and facilitate portfolio firms’
access to external sources of finance. This allows portfolio firms to invest in innovation
activity, which would not have been possible pre-LBO.
The results show that PE-backed LBOs have a positive causal effect on both patenting and
quality-adjusted patents measured by forward citations. We show that LBOs cause an
increase in novel patent activity rather than an increase in strategic patenting. Further analysis
shows that the impact is predominantly driven by private-to-private LBO transactions,
particularly in financially dependent industries and among firms that are more likely to be
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financially constrained before the LBO. The findings are consistent with PE firms relaxing
financial constraints in portfolio firms, facilitating their investment in innovation activity.
We have controlled for a variety of other factors that might also impact on innovation.
However, we would note that there are limitations of our empirical analyses. Our measure of
innovation is limited to patent data which has well known limitations as we discuss in section
4.2. While our results indicate that strategic patenting is unlikely to be the main driver of our
results, it has to be left for future research to analyze how PE affects broader measures of
innovation such as new products and new processes in general. Although we provide a
variety of results which are consistent with PE firms alleviating financing constraints, we
cannot completely rule out alternative channels by which PE affects innovation. As such, our
study opens the way for future research to attempt to measure financial constraints in
portfolio firms before and after LBOs more directly.
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Table 1
Summary statistics and variable definitions
Variable Description Mean SD
Firm and industry-level variables
PE =1 if buyout in year t, 0 else 0.002
0.049Post_PE =1 for all years after a buyout, 0 else 10
Patent count Number of patent applications in current year 0.048 1.817
Quality-adjusted
patent count
Number of patent applications in current year,
weighted by the number of citations
0.983 128.1
Patent stock Cumulated number of patents till current year 0.406 11.078
Quality-adjusted
patent stock
Cumulated number of patents till year t, weighted
by citations
20.614 1,405.1
Strategic patents Cumulated patents weighted by “XY” citations 2.394 197.2
Applicant-cited
patents





Cumulated patents weighted by citations
excluding “XY” and applicants’ citations
17.443 1145.4
Sales Sales 27,511 204,00
0Employees Number of employees 206.5 1483.1
Capital Tangible fixed assets 9,481 95,848
Fixed assets Fixed assets 15,858 31,900
0Labprod Labour productivity, Sales per employee 360.25 4, 42
Cap_Emp Capital per employee 313.95 8,299
Age Firm age in years 22.014 21.215
Sales growth Logarithmic yearly sales growth rate 0.09 0.509
d_export =1 if overseas sales>0, 0 else 0.325 0.469
Av_wage Average wage per employee 34.20 101.11
Profit_sales Profits/Sales * 100 0.626 58.26
Leverage Loans + overdrafts + liabilities / equity *100 304.16 870.06
Quiscore Inverse indicator of likelihood of default 74.730 22.539
Findep Industry-level financial dependence (US data) 0.066 0.298
Findep(UK) Industry-level financial dependence (UK data) 0.217 0.377
Competition Average of 1-Lerner Index (industry level) 0.943 0.027
Variables at the PE firm / buyout level
Experience equity # of previous deals involving equity 11.216 30.746
Experience debt # of previous deals involving debt 29.283 27.930
Exp equity sector # of prev. deals involving equity in industry 10.378 15.938
Exp debt sector # of prev. deals involving debt in industry 15.865 23.617
PE × Pub2Priv = 1 if public to private buyout 0.091
PE × Priv2Priv = 1 if private to private buyout 0.472
PE × Divisional =1 if divisional buyout 0.283
PE × Secondary =1 if secondary buyout 0.155
Equity_syndicate =1 for equity provider syndication 0.025
Debt_syndicate =1 for debt provider syndication 0.140
Ratchet =1 if PE firm uses an equity ratchet 0.118
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Table 2
Propensity score estimation, Probit model (Dependent variable = PE)



















Patent citation stock -0.00001
(0.00003)
Observations 143,653
Pseudo R squared 0.110
Log likelihood -2486.5
LR test (chi squared) 615.11




Variable Sample Treated Control t-test, p>|t|
Propensity score Unmatched 0.0104 0.0024 0.000
Matched 0.0104 0.0104 0.998
ln_sales Unmatched 9.9017 8.8335 0.000
Matched 9.9017 9.8813 0.851
ln_Labprod Unmatched 4.6661 4.8842 0.000
Matched 4.6661 4.657 0.887
d_export Unmatched 0.3123 0.3249 0.616
Matched 0.3123 0.3381 0.468
ln_av_wage Unmatched 3.1276 3.2345 0.004
Matched 3.1276 3.1846 0.196
ln_age Unmatched 2.7396 2.7341 0.915
Matched 2.7396 2.7044 0.628
ln_capital Unmatched 7.8350 6.5577 0.000
Matched 7.8350 7.7925 0.796
Patent stock Unmatched 1.0098 0.3787 0.350
Matched 1.0098 0.5798 0.349
Patent citation stock Unmatched 25.833 20.599 0.927
Matched 25.833 17.165 0.712
Profit_sales Unmatched -.00893 -.64032 0.829
Matched -.00893 -.03416 0.726
Leverage Unmatched 256.65 303.20 0.280
Matched 256.65 245.59 0.820
Table 4
ATT from propensity score matching
Panel A: Patent stock
t+1 t+2 t+3
PE 0.166* 0.278** 0.383**
(0.075) (0.121) (0.156)
Number of observations 814 814 814
Panel B: Citation-weighted patent stock
t+1 t+2 t+3
PE 0.747** 1.127** 1.292**
(0.338) (0.518) (0.581)
Number of observations 814 814 814
Notes: (1) The dependent variable is the change in the cumulated stock of patents in Panel A; (2) in
Panel B, patents are weighted by forward citations; (3) PE is a dummy variable taking value one after
a private equity financed buyout, zero otherwise; (4) All regressions include time dummies; (5) robust
standard errors in parentheses; (6) * p<0.1 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01.
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Table 5
Heterogeneous effects by deal type
Panel A: Patent stock
t+1 t+2 t+3
PE × Priv2Priv 0.401** 0.691** 0.940***
(0.162) (0.269) (0.350)
PE × Pub2Priv -0.064 -0.130* -0.162
(0.043) (0.077) (0.101)
PE × Secondary -0.006 -0.043 -0.046
(0.034) (0.055) (0.072)
PE × Divisional -0.047 -0.090* -0.113*
(0.030) (0.049) (0.061)
Number of observations 814 814 814
Panel B: Citation-weighted patent stock
t+1 t+2 t+3
PE × Priv2Priv 1.662** 2.520** 2.902**
(0.736) (1.138) (1.311)
PE × Pub2Priv -0.021 0.043 0.039
(0.117) (0.218) (0.254)
PE × Secondary -0.103 -0.205 -0.261
(0.175) (0.280) (0.364)
PE × Divisional -0.074 -0.131 -0.156
(0.094) (0.152) (0.193)
Number of observations 814 814 814
Notes: (1) The dependent variable is the change in the cumulated stock of patents in Panel A; (2) in
Panel B, patents are weighted by forward citations; (3) PE is a dummy variable taking value one after
a private equity financed buyout, zero otherwise; (4) Priv2Priv is a binary variable for private-to-
private deals, Pub2Priv is a binary variable for public-to-private deals, Secondary is a binary variable
for secondary buyouts, and Divisional is a binary variable for divisional buyouts; (5) all regressions
include time dummies; (6) robust standard errors in parentheses; (7) * p<0.1 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01.
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Table 6
The effect of LBOs on financially dependent firms
Panel A: Patent stock
t+1 t+2 t+3
PE -0.040 -0.082* -0.100*
(0.025) (0.041) (0.051)
PE × findep -0.064 -0.130 -0.178
(0.065) (0.127) (0.166)
PE × Priv2Priv 0.297** 0.598** 0.808**
(0.138) (0.260) -0.341
PE × Priv2Priv × findep 1.588*** 1.981*** 2.624***
(0.477) (0.682) (0.924)
Findep 0.047 0.112* 0.154*
(0.031) (0.066) -0.085
Number of observations 814 814 814
Panel B: Citation-weighted patent stock
t+1 t+2 t+3
PE -0.062 -0.110 -0.137
(0.071) (0.129) (0.166)
PE × findep -0.153 -0.212 -0.261
(0.246) (0.459) (0.602)
PE × Priv2Priv 1.354* 1.717 2.086
(0.799) (1.084) (1.302)
PE × Priv2Priv × findep 4.044** 9.807** 10.282**
(1.767) (4.147) (4.352)
Findep 0.087 0.195 0.231
(0.078) (0.144) (0.179)
Number of observations 814 814 814
Notes: (1) the dependent variable is the change in the cumulated stock of patents in Panel A; in Panel
B, patents are weighted by forward citations; (3) PE is a dummy variable taking value one after a
buyout, zero otherwise, Findep is a measure of financial dependence at the industry level, Priv2Priv is
a dummy variable indicating private-to-private deals; (4) all regressions include time dummies; (5)
standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the industry level; (6) * p<0.1 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01.
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Table 7
The effect of LBOs on firms with a low Quiscore
Panel A: Patent stock
t+1 t+2 t+3
PE 0.024 0.015 0.025
(0.179) (0.259) (0.335)
PE × D(quiscore≤80)  -0.028 -0.051 -0.020 
(0.313) (0.454) (0.586)
PE × Priv2Priv 0.488** 0.901*** 1.250***
(0.215) (0.312) (0.404)
PE × Priv2Priv* D(quiscore≤80) 0.688 0.683 0.642 
(0.438) (0.636) (0.822)
D(quiscore≤80) 0.002 0.019 -0.022 
(0.180) (0.261) (0.337)
Number of observations 377 377 377
Panel B: Citation-weighted patent stock
t+1 t+2 t+3
PE 0.073 0.228 0.236
(0.407) (1.018) (1.029)
PE × D(quiscore≤80)  -0.031 -0.300 -0.260 
(0.712) (1.783) (1.802)
PE × Priv2Priv 0.707 0.851 0.978
(0.490) (1.227) (1.240)
PE × Priv2Priv × D(quiscore≤80) 1.713* 7.517*** 7.365*** 
(0.998) (2.499) (2.525)
D(quiscore≤80) -0.041 0.069 0.032 
(0.410) (1.026) (1.037)
Number of observations 377 377 377
Notes: (1) the dependent variable is the change in the cumulated stock of patents in Panel A; in Panel B, patents are weighted
by forward citations; (3) PE is a dummy variable taking value one after a buyout, zero otherwise; Quiscore is a measure of
credit worthiness and D(quiscore<80) takes on a value of one for levels of quiscore below 80, zero otherwise, Priv2Priv is a
dummy variable indicating private-to-private deals; (4) all regressions include time dummies; (5) standard errors in
parentheses are clustered at the industry level; (6) * p<0.1 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01.
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Table 8
Additional controls and interaction terms
Panel A: Patent stock
t+3 t+3 t+3 t+3 t+3 t+3 t+3 t+3 t+3
PE -0.076** -0.069 -0.093* -0.361** -4.392 -0.202 -0.236 -0.212 0.447
(0.036) (0.060) (0.048) (0.164) (2.759) (0.202) (0.194) (0.223) (3.134)
PE × findep -0.165 -0.186 -0.170 -1.239* -0.210 -0.178 -0.236 -0.165 -1.262*
(0.148) (0.170) (0.159) (0.660) (0.170) (0.175) (0.215) (0.154) (0.672)
PE × Priv2Priv 0.817** 0.788** 0.801** 0.723** 0.801** 0.780** 0.778** 0.828** 0.674**
(0.350) (0.334) (0.336) (0.307) (0.339) (0.321) (0.316) (0.366) (0.287)
PE × Priv2Priv × findep 2.598*** 2.627*** 2.629*** 3.029*** 2.656*** 2.644*** 2.729*** 2.629*** 3.107***
(0.895) (0.925) (0.931) (1.086) (0.927) (0.955) (1.003) (0.917) (1.151)
findep 0.154* 0.153* 0.142* 0.106* 0.154* 0.153* 0.156* 0.153* 0.092
(0.086) (0.085) (0.081) (0.058) (0.086) (0.084) (0.090) (0.084) (0.063)
PE × ratchet -0.244 -0.148
(0.331) (0.285)
PE × Equity_syndicate -0.217** -0.026
(0.100) (0.293)
PE × Debt_syndicate -0.114 -0.174
(0.088) (0.156)












PE × Experience_equity -0.003 -0.006
(0.005) (0.009)
PE × Experience_debt 0.005 0.003
(0.006) (0.004)
PE × Exper_equity_sector -0.001 0.001
(0.002) (0.003)
PE × Exper_debt_sector 0.010 0.008
(0.011) (0.010)
PE × MBI 0.226 0.277
(0.374) (0.410)
Number of observations 814 814 814 814 814 814 814 814 814
-Table 8 continued on next page-
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Panel B: Citation-weighted patents – Table 8 continued
t+3 t+3 t+3 t+3 t+3 t+3 t+3 t+3 t+3
PE -0.157 -0.051 -0.074 -0.694 -3.023 -0.798 -0.614 -0.272 8.081
(0.197) (0.176) (0.157) (0.604) (7.381) (0.931) (0.740) (0.697) (13.479)
PE × findep -0.272 -0.280 -0.252 -2.531 -0.269 -0.245 -0.478 -0.246 -2.657
(0.561) (0.622) (0.582) (2.579) (0.587) (0.640) (0.839) (0.549) (2.662)
PE × Priv2Priv 2.079 2.030 2.054 1.904 2.087 1.884 1.948 2.110 1.615
(1.326) (1.284) (1.285) (1.178) (1.309) (1.144) (1.177) (1.380) (1.024)
PE × Priv2Priv × findep 10.304** 10.285** 10.296** 11.145** 10.277** 10.418** 10.694** 10.287** 11.450**
(4.328) (4.346) (4.371) (4.835) (4.348) (4.563) (4.847) (4.361) (5.302)
findep 0.231 0.231 0.204 0.135 0.245 0.225 0.238 0.230 0.091
(0.181) (0.179) (0.156) (0.132) (0.184) (0.179) (0.183) (0.175) (0.128)
PE × ratchet 0.202 0.368
(2.195) (2.105)
PE × Equity_syndicate -0.509 0.654
(0.542) (0.980)
PE × Debt_syndicate -0.322 -0.557
(0.274) (0.586)












PE × Experience_equity -0.029 -0.047
(0.023) (0.034)
PE × Experience_debt 0.036 0.031
(0.033) (0.027)
PE × Exper_equity_sector -0.006 0.011
(0.007) (0.009)
PE × Exper_debt_sector 0.039 0.021
(0.044) (0.033)
PE × MBI 0.273 0.444
(1.146) (1.292)
Number of observations 814 814 814 814 814 814 814 814 814
Notes: (1) The dependent variable is the change in the patent stock (measured at period t+3) in Panel A; (2) in Panel B, patents are weighted by
forward citations; (3) PE is a dummy variable taking value one after a buyout, Priv2Priv indicates private-to-private deals, Equity_syndicate
(Debt_syndicate) is a dummy variable indicating two or more equity (debt) providers, ratchet is a dummy variable indicating whether an equity
ratchet is used, Manufacturing indicates manufacturing industries, leverage is a debt equity ratio, experience_equity is the cumulative number of
deals in which a PE firm has provided equity, experience_debt is the cumulative number of deals in which a PE firm has provided equity, findep
measures financial dependence, and Competition is measured as 1 minus the average of the Lerner Index (price-cost margin) within industries; (4) all
regressions include time dummies; (5) Robust standard errors in parentheses; (6) * p<0.1 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01.
